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Early Evidence on the Use of Foreign Cash Following the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) reduces multinational firms’ internal 
capital market frictions through a deemed repatriation of unremitted foreign earnings and 
eliminating future repatriation tax costs. This change to the U.S. corporate tax system 
permanently reduces repatriation costs and gives multinational firms access to lower cost internal 
capital (i.e., foreign cash). This study provides evidence that multinational firms with greater 
levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash increased their post-TCJA repurchases but did not change their 
shareholder dividends or capital expenditures, on average. We further document that the increase 
in repurchases is driven by those firms that had greater pre-TCJA repatriation tax costs and 
costlier access to external finance (i.e., marginally weak financial health firms). While we do not 
find a relationship in the sample-wide analysis, we do find a positive relation between foreign 
cash and post-TCJA capital expenditures for firms that are in marginally weak financial health. 
Furthermore, the increase in total capital expenditures is primarily due to an increase in domestic 
capital expenditures rather than foreign capital expenditures. This outcome is consistent with 
internal capital market theory and suggests a decrease in internal capital market frictions allows 
companies access to trapped foreign cash.  
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Early Evidence on the Use of Foreign Cash Following the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) dramatically changed the United States (U.S.) 
corporate tax landscape. Before the TCJA, if U.S. multinational firms repatriated earnings from a 
foreign subsidiary to the U.S. parent, they were required to pay taxes on the difference between 
the U.S. statutory tax rate and the effective foreign tax rate when the U.S. tax rate was higher. 
The repatriation tax created internal capital market frictions between foreign subsidiaries and the 
U.S. parent (De Simone and Lester 2018); many firms indefinitely deferred payment of 
repatriation taxes and consequently held large amounts of cash overseas (Foley, Hartzell, 
Titman, and Twite 2007). Among several sweeping provisions, the TCJA required a deemed 
repatriation of unremitted foreign earnings (UFE) and eliminated future federal repatriation tax 
costs for U.S. multinational firms.1 The intent of this change is to decrease internal capital 
market frictions and allow foreign cash to be more easily repatriated to the domestic parent 
(Garber 2017).2 This study examines whether a decrease in repatriation costs created by the 
TCJA effects multinational firms’ spending and investment of foreign cash.  
The recent passing of the TCJA provides a salient setting to investigate the effect of internal 
capital market inefficiencies on firm investment. The literature provides evidence that 
repatriation costs lead to an increase in cash held by foreign subsidiaries (Foley et al. 2007), 
resulting in a higher likelihood of managers using foreign cash for value-destroying foreign 
investments (Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi 2015; Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson 2016), less efficient 
 
1 See Section 2 for additional details. 
2 Foreign cash is related to, but not equivalent to permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) or unremitted foreign 
earnings (UFE). Laplante and Nesbit (2017) discuss the differences between foreign cash, PRE and UFE; Blaylock, 
Downes, Mathis, and White (2019) document the high correlation (>90%) between PRE and estimated UFE. We 
choose to examine foreign cash because it is often held overseas for tax reasons (Foley et al., 2007) and it is the 
most liquid asset that is likely to be used for investment purposes in the post-TCJA setting. Foreign cash disclosures 
are also the most reliable, publicly available estimates of firms’ foreign cash balances. 
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investment (Amberger, Markle, and Samuel 2018), fewer shareholder payouts and higher levels 
of abnormal debt (Beyer, Downes, and Rapley 2017; Nessa 2017; De Simone and Lester 2018). 
Based on internal capital market theory, we expect an increase in financially constrained firms’ 
domestic capital expenditures following a decrease in internal capital market frictions (i.e., a 
decrease in repatriation costs [Myers and Majluf, 1984]) if these firms have domestic investment 
opportunities. 
Opponents of the TCJA argue that the repatriated earnings would have a significant effect on 
shareholder payouts, but not domestic investment (Bloomberg 2017). For example, economist 
Kyle Pomerleau stated: “A company could get an extra couple of billion from overseas, but that 
doesn’t change their willingness to invest the cash. Most analysts, myself included, assumed that 
repatriation would provide no boost in investments” (Davis and Chandra 2018). Relatedly, S&P 
500 dividends and stock repurchases were the highest they have ever been during the fourth 
quarter of 2018; these firms’ shareholder payouts totaled a record-high $1.26 trillion during 2018 
(PR Newswire 2019). De Simone and Lester (2018) provide evidence that firms with tax-induced 
foreign cash may substitute debt issuance for repatriation, indicating that U.S. firms with tax-
induced foreign cash do not forgo domestic investment opportunities if they are not financially 
constrained. Consistent with these expectations, prior research documents that the American Jobs 
Creation Act (AJCA) tax holiday resulted in repatriations by firms with limited investment 
opportunities, and these firms increased payouts to shareholders, but only marginally increased 
domestic investment (Blouin and Krull 2009; Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 2011). According 
to the AJCA tax holiday literature, if firms do not have domestic investment opportunities and/or 
are not financially constrained, we would not expect a change to domestic investment, and 
instead expect an increase in shareholder payouts following the TCJA.  
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We examine our research question using the TCJA as a proxy for the permanent reduction in 
repatriation costs causing an exogenous shock to firms’ internal capital markets. We examine the 
change in shareholder payouts (i.e., total payouts, dividends and repurchases) and capital 
expenditures following TCJA.3 The sample is comprised of 400 multinational firms for the years 
2015, 2016 and 2018. The year 2017 is omitted because it includes cash spending decisions from 
both the pre- and post-TCJA time period.4 We document an increase in post-TCJA shareholder 
payout for firms with greater levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash. The increase in total shareholder 
payout for high foreign cash firms is driven by an increase in repurchases and not dividends. The 
increase in post-TCJA repurchases is strongest among firms with greater pre-TCJA repatriation 
costs and for firms in marginally weak pre-TCJA financial health. 
We also document no incremental capital expenditure increase in the post-TCJA period, on 
average, for these high foreign cash firms. However, our results suggest that post-TCJA capital 
expenditures did increase more for firms with greater foreign cash that were in marginally weak 
financial health. This result is consistent with the AJCA findings documented in Faulkender and 
Petersen (2012). We extend this result further and document that domestic capital expenditures, 
and not foreign capital expenditures, drove the increase in post-TCJA investment for this set of 
firms. Finally, we find no evidence that multinational firms make capital expenditures in 
response to growth opportunities. Our findings are robust to using a difference-in-differences 
research design that compares post-TCJA multinational firm expenditures to domestic-only firm 
expenditures, alleviating the concern that our results are due to changes other than the taxation of 
 
3 The TCJA’s main objective was economic growth, which may include many forms of investment (e.g., job 
creation, increased wages, expanding the business by acquiring other companies, engaging in more R&D). We 
choose shareholder payouts and capital expenditures because compared to acquisitions, shareholder payouts and 
capital expenditures require less regulatory oversight and therefore can be executed in a timelier manner. Our 
sample period in the post-TCJA timeframe is short and therefore we may be unable to identify economic growth 
through incrementally more acquisitions. 
4 To be included in the sample, each firm must have annual data for all three years. 
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foreign earnings within the TCJA (i.e., statutory tax rate decrease, 100 percent bonus 
depreciation, or the limitation on interest deductibility).  
We make three contributions to the literature. First, Clemons and Shevlin (2016) argue that 
policymakers only consider academic research when it is directly useful to those involved in the 
policymaking process, and the authors argue the most effective way for research to affect tax 
policy is to specifically discuss tax policy in research papers. This paper accomplishes both of 
those objectives. Our study highlights that initial evidence indicates that post-TCJA shareholder 
payout increased for firms with large amounts of pre-TCJA foreign cash (i.e., firms most 
impacted by a reduction in repatriation costs). Given a stated objective of tax reform was to 
increase economic growth (Whitehouse.gov), which can be accomplished through domestic 
investment, we believe our findings are particularly relevant to policymakers. Specifically, we 
provide evidence about investment behavior after the enactment of the TCJA. 
Second, this study builds on prior literature examining the effect of reductions in internal 
capital market frictions on domestic investment. Using the AJCA as a setting for reduced internal 
capital market frictions, prior studies find no evidence that the modified world-wide tax system 
limited U.S. multinationals domestic investment because they do not document an increase in 
investment following the AJCA tax holiday (Blouin and Krull 2009; Dharmapala et al. 2011). 
While the AJCA was a temporary, non-mandatory tax holiday, the TCJA is mandatory, requiring 
a deemed repatriation with a change to a quasi-territorial system along with various other 
provisions aimed at increasing domestic investment. However, despite the differences in the tax 
policies, our results indicate that, with the exception of marginally weak financial health firms, 
U.S. multinationals with high pre-TCJA foreign cash did not increase capital expenditures. Prior 
literature that examines the change from a worldwide to territorial tax system in Japan and the 
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United Kingdom documents that firms accumulate less cash, payout cash to shareholders via 
dividends and repurchases, and invest less abroad following the change in tax system (Arena and 
Kutner, 2015). Our evidence documents similar results. Taken together, our study supports TCJA 
critics’ claims that payouts to shareholders would increase following the permanent reduction in 
repatriation costs.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature examining the influence of taxes on firm decision-
making. Edwards et al. (2016) and Hanlon et al. (2015) provide evidence that firms make less 
successful foreign acquisitions with trapped foreign cash. Additionally, Blouin and Krull (2009) 
and Dharmapala et al. (2011) provide evidence that firms increased share repurchases in 
response to the AJCA tax holiday. We contribute to this literature by providing evidence that 
high foreign cash firms increased shareholder repurchases and not capital expenditures in 
response to the TCJA, indicating that the U.S. worldwide tax system influenced firm decision-
making. 
The next section describes the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Section 3 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research methodology and sample 
selection. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017 
President Trump and a Republican-controlled Congress turned their attention to tax reform in 
the late stages of summer 2017. The House Ways and Means Committee released a draft bill on 
November 2nd and approved it on November 9th. On November 16th, the House floor passed a 
revised version and the Senate Finance Committee approved a version of the tax reform bill. The 
Senate passed a revised bill on December 2nd. The final TCJA was passed in the House of 
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Representatives and Senate on December 19th and December 20th, respectively. President Trump 
then signed the TCJA into law on December 22, 2017. 
Major corporate tax changes under the TCJA fall into four categories: statutory tax rate 
decrease, 100 percent bonus depreciation, interest deductibility, and foreign earnings taxation. 
First, the TCJA reduces the corporate statutory tax rate from a maximum rate of 35 to a flat rate 
of 21 percent. Second, the TCJA allows firms to deduct 100 percent of qualified capital 
expenditures as bonus depreciation and increases IRC Sec. 179 expensing to $1,000,000. 
Previously, firms could deduct 50 percent of capital expenditures as bonus depreciation with the 
ability to expense an additional $510,000 in qualifying IRC Sec. 179 depreciation. Third, the 
TCJA limits the deductibility of business interest expense to business interest income plus 30 
percent of adjusted taxable income.5 Fourth, the TCJA moves the U.S. from a modified 
worldwide tax system to a quasi-territorial tax system.  
To transition the U.S. to a quasi-territorial tax system, the TCJA required a deemed 
repatriation of unremitted foreign earnings from specified foreign corporations (SFCs).6 The 
deemed repatriation is subject to a dividends received deduction that effectively reduces the tax 
rate to 15.5 percent for foreign cash and 8 percent for other assets with the ability to utilize 
foreign tax credits (FTCs) to reduce this tax liability, which is payable over eight years (Nevius 
2017). Under the new, quasi-territorial tax system, SFCs receive a 100 percent dividends 
received deduction for foreign earnings, effectively eliminating U.S. federal repatriation taxes on 
 
5 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec. 163(j) defines the limitation on interest deductibility. Adjusted taxable income 
is computed without allowable deductions for amortization, depreciation, depletion, or business interest expense. 
Additionally, firms whose average gross receipts do not exceed $25 million for the three prior years are exempt from 
the business interest expense limitation.  
6 SFCs are controlled foreign corporations with a domestic corporation shareholder owning 10 percent or more of 
the stock for its last tax year prior to January 1, 2018. U.S. multinational companies include as subpart F income 
their pro-rata share of the greater of the SFCs accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income determined as of 
November 2, 2017 or December 31, 2017. 
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those future earnings.7 All else equal, a shift to a quasi-territorial tax system could increase profit 
shifting as foreign source income is exempt from home country taxation. However, the TCJA 
contains several provisions such as the GILTI inclusion, FDII deduction, and the base erosion 
and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) to limit profit shifting. Additionally, the reduced U.S. corporate tax 
rate decreases the benefits of shifting profits abroad as the spread between the U.S. statutory rate 
and foreign tax rates decreases or disappears. 
  
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Internal Capital Market and Domestic Investment 
Firms with efficient internal capital markets create value by allocating resources to business 
segments unable to generate sufficient funding for investment opportunities (Weston 1970; 
Williamson 1975; Stein 1997; Billett and Mauer 2003). For example, firms can use cash flow 
from one business segment or division to fund a capital project in another business segment or 
division. Efficient internal capital markets allow financially constrained business segments to 
access lower cost internal capital to fund positive net present value projects.  
The literature documents several frictions that create inefficient internal capital markets: 
internal agency costs, external agency costs, and repatriation costs. First, Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2007) suggest that when internal agency problems between parent company managers and 
foreign operations managers increase, firms are more likely to repatriate cash held in foreign 
subsidiaries to avoid foreign operations managers’ self-maximizing behavior. For firms with 
centralized treasury functions, internal agency costs are less of a concern. However, external 
 
7 U.S. multinational firms could still have state repatriation taxes and foreign withholding taxes on remitted 
earnings. As a result, some firms have significantly reduced rather than eliminated internal capital market frictions 
with regards to repatriated funds. 
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agency costs, arising from the agency conflict between parent company managers and 
shareholders, may also increase the likelihood of misallocation of internal resources. The 
literature suggests external agency costs could encourage managers to extract private benefits of 
control by investing in suboptimal growth opportunities (Jensen 1986; Hope and Thomas 2008), 
make value-destroying capital expenditures (Shin and Stulz 1998) and acquisitions (Hanlon et al. 
2015; Edwards et al. 2016), and acquiesce to rent-seeking behavior by subsidiary managers 
(Datta, D’Mello, and Iskandar-Datta 2009). 
Finally, repatriation costs may limit firms’ ability to allocate resources among their domestic 
and international business operations efficiently. Theory and prior empirical work indicate that 
using internal capital to fund operations within a firm is generally less costly than external 
capital because of information asymmetry problems (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Shyam-Sunders and Myers 1999). However, large multinational firms continued to issue debt to 
satisfy investors’ demands of return of capital in the pre-TCJA era. For example, to complete 
repurchases and the payment of dividends, Apple borrowed $17 billion in 2013 (Lattman and 
Eavis 2013), and eBay borrowed $3 billion in 2012 (Mead and Kucera 2012). Beyer et al. (2017) 
provide evidence consistent with repatriation costs increasing abnormal debt to fund shareholder 
payouts. De Simone and Lester (2018) document that frictions created by repatriation taxes 
explain the use of external domestic debt financing by these cash-rich firms. Because of the 
increased tax and financial reporting costs associated with repatriations, research suggests a 
positive association between repatriation costs and cash held by foreign subsidiaries (Foley et al. 
2007; Hanlon et al. 2015). 
Prior literature explores the effect of the American Jobs Creation Act on firm behavior. The 
AJCA temporarily decreased repatriation taxes on foreign earnings, temporarily making internal 
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capital less costly to access.8 On the one hand, Blouin and Krull (2009) and Dharmapala et al. 
(2011) provide evidence consistent with firms using repatriated earnings from the AJCA tax 
holiday to increase shareholder payouts instead of domestic capital investments. On the other 
hand, Faulkender and Petersen (2012) find that while most firms that voluntarily repatriated 
earnings increased shareholder payouts, financially constrained (i.e., weaker financial health) 
firms increased domestic investment after the AJCA. Additionally, Arena and Kutner (2015) 
examine the United Kingdom and Japan transitions from worldwide tax systems to territorial tax 
systems and find that payouts increase but document no change in domestic investment. These 
results confirm that reductions in internal capital market frictions only increase domestic 
investment when firms have financial constraints and domestic investment opportunities. 
While prior research documents that reductions in repatriation taxes largely lead to increases 
in shareholder payouts and not capital investment, there are unique features of the TCJA that 
could lead to differing results. Specifically, while the AJCA was temporary and participation was 
optional, the deemed repatriation under the TCJA and the quasi-territorial tax system are 
mandatory and implement large inclusion regimes (i.e., GILTI) that are unique to the U.S.9 The 
permanent reduction in repatriation taxes grants companies access to additional cash on a long-
term basis. As a result, companies may be more likely to make long-term capital investment 
decisions rather than short-term shareholders payouts via share repurchases which are generally 
made as a result of temporary cash inflows (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Brav, Graham, Harvey, 
 
8 Similar to the TCJA, the AJCA provided a dividends received deduction for repatriating firms. However, the 
AJCA provided an 85 percent dividends received deduction when the statutory tax rate was 35 percent, resulting in 
an effective 5.25 percent tax rate on repatriated earnings minus any available foreign tax credits. The dividends 
received deduction was offered on the greater of $500 million or earnings designated as permanently reinvested in 
the financial statements issued on or before June 20, 2003. Additionally, repatriation under the AJCA was optional. 
9 For example, the TCJA introduces a global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) inclusion to discourage income 
shifting from the U.S. to foreign jurisdictions and among foreign jurisdictions. Importantly, GILTI proxy for 
intangible income using a return on foreign tangible assets. Thus, to minimize overall taxes, firms can minimize 
their GILTI inclusion by increasing foreign investment in tangible assets. 
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and Michaely, 2005; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Beyer et al., 2017). Further, in 
contrast to prior findings related to the United Kingdom and Japan transitions to a territorial tax 
system (Arena and Kutner, 2015), the United States has greater opportunities for companies to 
invest capital.10 Additionally, Hanlon, Hoopes, and Slemrod (2018) analyze earnings conference 
calls and find a number of firms stating they would increase investment post-TCJA. Further, 
their study finds that firms with greater expected tax savings from the TCJA are more likely to 
announce investment plans. Therefore, because repatriation taxes increase the cost of accessing 
internal capital, the new U.S. tax policy significantly reduces repatriation taxes, and firms are 
communicating plans to increase investment, U.S. multinational firms could increase capital 
expenditures post-TCJA. 
Due to the significant differences between the TCJA and the AJCA and the findings from 
Hanlon et al. (2018), we examine the relation between firms’ foreign cash levels pre-TCJA and 
shareholder payouts and capital expenditures post-TCJA.11 The enactment of the TCJA created a 
permanent reduction in repatriation taxes decreasing internal capital market frictions, and, in 
turn, providing companies access to lower cost internal capital to spend on domestic capital 
investments. Prior literature suggests the AJCA, a temporary tax holiday, increased shareholder 
payout but did not increase capital expenditures (Blouin and Krull. 2009; Dharmapala et al., 
2011). However, there are reasons to believe the different tax provisions included in the TCJA 
may lead to companies making different decisions about how they spend their excess foreign 
cash. Therefore, our hypotheses are stated in the null form: 
 
10 According to World Population Review (GDP Ranked by Country 2019), which ranks the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) by country, the United States has by far the highest GDP ($21.41 trillion) compared to Japan (3rd, 
$5.36 trillion) and the United Kingdom (7th, $3.02 trillion). 
11 We recognize that firms have incentives and/or lack of consequences that can prompt managers to make claims 
that do not necessarily match their true intentions. For instance, Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010)’s survey 
reports U.S. capital investment as the most prominent use of repatriated cash from the AJCA. However, Blouin and 
Krull (2009) and Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) results do not support these claims. 
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Hypothesis 1a. Firms with higher levels of foreign cash pre-TCJA, compared to firms with lower 
levels of foreign cash, do not increase shareholder payouts post-TCJA. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Firms with higher levels of foreign cash pre-TCJA, compared to firms with 
lower levels of foreign cash, do not increase capital expenditures post-TCJA. 
 
In addition to the effects of reduced internal capital market frictions on domestic investment, 
other provisions of the TCJA may also impact domestic investment. Specifically, the corporate 
tax rate reduction should decrease the cost of capital, increasing the number of domestic, positive 
net present value projects. However, while bonus depreciation may increase incentives for 
capital expenditures, it may also dampen the impact of the corporate tax rate reduction on firm 
investment (Slemrod 2018). The effects of these two provisions should not be more pronounced 
among firms with high foreign cash unless repatriation costs under the old tax regime were a 
source of internal capital market frictions. We will examine these potential influences by 
comparing multinational firms to a sample of firms that only have domestic operations to 
eliminate these alternative explanations. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
4.1 Research Design  
To analyze the TCJA’s effect on corporate spending and investment, we first examine pre-
TCJA versus post-TCJA and focus on the incremental effect of pre-TCJA foreign cash on 
multinational firms’ post-TCJA expenditure. Our model examines expenditure (i.e., dividends, 
repurchases and capital expenditures) as a function of foreign cash and other firm characteristics.  
Expenditurei,t = α0 + α1Postt + α2Foreign Cashi + α3Foreign Cashi × Postt + α4Domestic 
Cashi + α5Book ETRi + α6Cash ETRi + α7Lossi,t + α8Sizei + 
α9Earningsi,t + α10Cash Flowi,t + α11Leveragei,t + α12MTBi,t + 
α13Sales Growthi,t + α14CapEx2014i + α15RDi,t + α16ACQi,t + α17Firm 
Agei,t + α18RE/BVi,t + α19Returnsi,t + α20Optionsi,t + α21St. Dev. 
Earningsi,t + α22Dividendsi,t-1 + α23Repurchasesi,t-1 + ε 
(1) 
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Equation (1) is estimated separately for each of the following dependent variable measures 
for Expenditure: Total Payout, Dividends, Repurchases, and CapEx. Total Payout is equal to the 
sum of cash distributions from dividends and share repurchases, all scaled by end of fiscal year 
2014 total assets.12 Dividends is defined as total dividends scaled by end of fiscal year 2014 total 
assets. Repurchases is equal to the purchase of common and preferred stock less any decrease in 
the redemption of preferred stock or less any decrease in preferred stock if the redemption value 
of preferred stock is missing, all scaled by end of fiscal year 2014 total assets. When examining 
payout levels, a Tobit regression is used to estimate Equation (1) given that many firms do not 
distribute cash to shareholders resulting in a dependent variable equal to zero. CapEx is capital 
expenditures scaled by end of fiscal year 2014 total assets. Foreign Cash is foreign cash balance 
at the end of fiscal year 2014 (hand-collected from 10-Ks) scaled by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year 2014. Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign cash scaled by total assets, all 
measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018 and 
zero for fiscal years ending prior to 2018. Foreign cash is not equivalent to permanently 
reinvested earnings (PRE) or unremitted foreign earnings (UFE). Laplante and Nesbit (2017) 
discuss the differences between foreign cash, PRE and UFE; Blaylock et al. (2019) document the 
high correlation (>90%) between PRE and estimated UFE. We examine foreign cash because it 
is often held overseas for tax reasons (Foley et al., 2007) and it is the most liquid asset that is 
likely to be used first for investment purposes in the post-TCJA setting. A positive and 
significant estimated coefficient on the interaction Foreign Cash × POST (α3) rejects Hypothesis 
1a and 1b. 
 
12 Fiscal year 2014 total assets is used as the common scalar (instead of lagged total assets) so that prior period’s 
expenditure does not affect the current period’s denominator in the variable calculation.  
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Control variables are based on other tax changes included in the TCJA and prior literature 
that examines payout policy (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Grullon, Paye, 
Underwood, and Weston, 2011) and capital investment (Canace, Jackson, and Ma, 2018). The 
TCJA lowered the overall U.S. corporate tax rate from a maximum of 35% to 21%. Such a 
lowering of the corporate rate would also benefit profitable firms with significant foreign cash. 
Therefore, we control for pre-TCJA effective tax rates. Book ETR is equal to fiscal year-end 
2014 income tax expense scaled by pretax income minus special items, truncated at zero and 
one. Cash ETR is equal to fiscal year-end 2014 cash taxes paid scaled by pretax income minus 
special items, truncated at zero and one. We expect more profitable firms and firms with higher 
effective tax rates to benefit more from a reduction of the corporate tax rate. Therefore, we also 
control for loss firms by including Loss, set equal to one when income before extraordinary items 
is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise.  
Size is equal to the natural logarithm of fiscal year 2014 total assets. Earnings is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by fiscal year 2014 total assets. Cash Flow is operating cash 
flows scaled by fiscal year 2014 total assets. Leverage is long term debt scaled by fiscal year 
2014 total assets. MTB is the market value of equity scaled by book value of equity. Sales 
Growth is current period sales minus prior period sales, all scaled by prior period sales. 
CapEx2014 is total capital expenditures scaled by total assets, all measured in fiscal year 2014. 
RD is total research and development expense scaled by fiscal year 2014 total assets. ACQ is 
funds spend on mergers and acquisitions scaled by fiscal year 2014 total assets.13 Firm Age is 
equal to the natural logarithm of the number of years that the firm has appeared in the Compustat 
database. RE/BV is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity.  
 
13 RD and ACQ are set equal to zero when missing in Compustat.  
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We also include controls for past stock returns (Returns), stock options (Options), and 
volatility of earnings (St. Dev. Earnings). Returns is measured as the firm’s stock return 
compounded monthly for the two-year period ending before the current year. Options is 
calculated as the annual percentage change in total diluted shares outstanding as if no 
repurchases occurred the current year. St. Dev. Earnings is measured as the standard deviation of 
earnings for the current and previous four years. We also include lagged values of shareholder 
payouts (Dividends and Repurchases) because they can be sticky from the previous year. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to lessen the influence of 
outliers and data errors. 
4.2 Sample Selection 
The TCJA became law on December 22, 2017. Due to limited availability of post-TCJA data 
for non-December fiscal year-ends, the sample is limited to firms with a calendar fiscal year-end 
and includes fiscal years 2015, 2016 and 2018. We exclude fiscal years ending on December 31, 
2017 because they include both pre- and post-TCJA activity. Our analysis compares two years 
pre-TCJA to one year post-TCJA, however, inferences remain the same when we compare one 
year pre-TCJA (2016) to one year post-TCJA (2018). We choose to use an unbalanced sample to 
alleviate the concern that firms invested less in 2016 due to economic uncertainty and were 
postponing investment until after potential tax reform becomes effective. We include firms in the 
sample when they have all variables available in 2015, 2016 and 2018, and disclose foreign cash 
in fiscal year 2014. About 64 percent of multinational firms disclose foreign cash in fiscal year 
2014.14 The analysis utilizes 1,200 annual observations for 400 multinational firms with data 
available on Standard and Poor’s Compustat.  
 
14 Our inferences are subject to the caveat that they only apply to firms that disclose foreign cash. However, firms 
that disclose foreign cash are large firms that have greater amounts of total cash and are the most profitable 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. The mean (median) 
Total Payout is 5.7 (2.9) percent of assets which is influenced more by Repurchases rather than 
Dividends which have a mean (median) of 4.1 (1.4) and 1.6 (0.2) percent of assets, respectively. 
The mean (median) of CapEx is 4.2 (1.7) percent of assets. By construction, the average for 
POST is 0.333 indicating that each firm has three years of data included (i.e., two years pre-
TCJA and one year post-TCJA). On average, firms have 8.4 (11.7) percent of their total assets 
held in foreign (domestic) cash.  
Table 2 reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal. 
All bold and italicized correlations are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Consistent 
with expectations, the positive correlations between the measures and their lagged values 
indicate that shareholder payouts and capital expenditure are generally persistent from year to 
year. Additionally, each shareholder payout and capital expenditures have increased post-TCJA 
as evidenced by their positive correlation with Post. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 The Use of Foreign Cash Following the TCJA: Baseline Regressions 
Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates from our baseline regression specification 
described above in section 4.1. The sample includes two years pre-TCJA and one year post-
TCJA for multinational firms. The dependent variable is Total Payout, Dividends, Repurchases 
and CapEx across the columns. In column 1, the coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post is positive 
and significant (t-statistic=1.95) suggesting that multinational firms with greater levels of pre-
 
(Bjornsen, Downes, and Omer, 2019) making them most likely to make economically-impactful investments 
following the TCJA.  
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TCJA foreign cash increased their shareholders payouts in the post-TCJA time period. 
Economically, a one standard deviation increase in foreign cash (0.085) leads to an incremental 
increase in post-TCJA payout of 19 percent.15 Average total assets of the sample are $8.02 
billion (untabulated). Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in pre-TCJA foreign cash is 
associated with a post-TCJA increase in total payout of $86 million or about 1 percent of assets.  
The increase in total payout is driven by an increase in repurchases and not dividends. 
Specifically, the coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post in column 2 is not significantly different 
from zero. However, the coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post in column 3 is positive and 
significant (t-statistic=1.78). Economically, a one standard deviation increase in pre-TCJA 
foreign cash leads to a 24 percent increase in post-TCJA repurchases. Finally, the coefficient on 
Foreign Cash × Post in column 4 is not significantly different from zero suggesting that 
multinational firms with large pre-TCJA foreign cash balances did not immediately increase their 
capital expenditures in the year following the TCJA compared to firms without large pre-TCJA 
foreign cash balances.  
The significant association between foreign cash and post-TCJA share repurchases and 
insignificant association between foreign cash and post-TCJA dividends is consistent with 
previous research. Prior literature indicates that shareholders react negatively to reductions in 
dividends (Aharony and Swary 1980). Blouin and Krull (2009) highlight that firms typically 
prefer repurchases to dividends because repurchases are not “sticky” (Guay and Harford 2000; 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 2000). Additionally, Blouin and Krull (2009) argue that 
share repurchases generate capital gains, which allows for the deferral of taxes, a return of 
capital upon sale, timing of sale to match capital losses, and use of capital loss carryforwards.  
 
15 ([0.085 × 0.126] ÷ 0.057) 
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The evidence in Table 3 rejects Hypothesis 1a but fails to reject Hypothesis 1b, suggesting 
that multinational firms with greater amounts of pre-TCJA foreign cash were most likely to use 
newly accessible foreign cash for shareholder repurchases and not dividends or capital 
expenditures. These results are largely consistent with the findings in Blouin and Krull (2009) 
who examine the consequences of the AJCA.  
5.2 Repatriation Costs 
In Table 4, we present cross-sectional analysis based on levels of repatriation costs. Firms 
with large amounts of foreign cash primarily accumulated those cash balances as a result of 
repatriation costs (Foley et al., 2007). If the TCJA drives the increase in repurchases then we 
expect the results from Table 3 to be the strongest for firms facing high repatriation costs 
because the TCJA largely eliminated repatriation costs. We limit the shareholder payout analysis 
to repurchases given that it drives the baseline results in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 examine 
repurchases for firms facing high and low pre-TCJA repatriation costs, respectively. The 
coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post is positive and significant (t-statistic=2.50) in the subset of 
firms facing high (i.e., above the sample median) repatriation costs. The coefficient estimate is 
not significantly different from zero for the subsample of firms facing low pre-TCJA repatriation 
costs (column 2). The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is capital expenditures, and the 
coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post continues to be insignificant consistent with our findings in 
Table 3. 
Overall, Table 4 documents that multinational firms with high levels of pre-TCJA foreign 
cash increased post-TCJA repurchases as a result of the reduction in repatriation costs. The 
TCJA reduced capital market frictions created by repatriation costs, which did not affect capital 
investment but instead increased payouts to shareholders.  
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5.3 Financial Health and Investment Opportunities 
We next examine whether the baseline results presented in Table 3 vary based on firms’ 
financial health and investment opportunities. Before the enactment of TCJA, managers were 
motivated to delay repatriation of foreign cash due to repatriation taxes which discouraged 
managers from taking advantage of investment opportunities and also from returning cash to 
shareholders resulting in internal capital market inefficiencies. However, firms in strong 
financial health, not financially constrained, have access to external financing to fund 
shareholder payouts (Beyer et al., 2017) and capital investments (Albring, 2006). To the extent 
internal capital market frictions created by repatriation taxes limited financially constrained (i.e., 
weak financial health) firms from returning cash to shareholders and taking advantage of 
domestic investment opportunities, shareholder payouts and capital expenditures should increase 
post-TCJA. Therefore, we expect the reduction in internal capital market frictions to primarily 
change the investment behavior of firms that are in weaker financial health (i.e., firms with 
greater borrowing costs in the pre-TCJA period). 
Table 5 examines repurchases and capital expenditures for firms in varying degrees of 
financial health. We partition the sample into quartiles of financial health based on the Altman 
(1968) Z-Score. The first, second, third and fourth quartiles are identified as weak, marginally 
weak, marginally strong and strong financial health firms, respectively.16 Columns 1 – 4 (5 – 8) 
examine repurchases (capital expenditures). The coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post is positive 
and significant for firms that are in the marginally weak financial health partition both when the 
dependent variable is Repurchases (column 2) and CapEx (column 6).17 This suggests that weak 
 
16 We do not perform a similar quartile analysis for repatriation costs because, similar to prior literature (Foley et al., 
2007; Nessa, 2017), more than half of the firms in the sample have calculated repatriation costs equal to zero.  
17 The sample Z-Score that corresponds to the second quartile is a Z-Score between 2.131 and 3.456 which is a little 
greater than how Altman (1968) defines the gray area of financial health (i.e., 1.8 – 3.0). Our sample of firms is 
19 
 
financial health firms did not respond to the TCJA given the lack of statistical significance in 
columns 1 and 5. Presumably, the weakest financial health firms have low foreign cash balances 
because their foreign operations are not profitable or they have had a need to previously access 
foreign cash (and incurred the repatriation cost under the pre-TCJA regime).18 However, it 
appears that the TCJA reduced capital market frictions for firms that were in a marginally weak 
financial health state and possibly did not have low-cost access to external capital. Interestingly, 
the TCJA affected repurchases and capital expenditures for the same set of firms. We interpret 
these findings to suggest that strong financial health firms had either the resources to meet 
investor repurchases demand in the pre-TCJA period, or these firms were able to obtain external 
financing in order to meet investor repurchases demand. We also identify a setting where capital 
expenditures increased for firms that had greater amounts of pre-TCJA foreign cash. 
Specifically, marginally weak financial health firms with greater levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash 
increased capital expenditures in the post-TCJA time period. This evidence is consistent with 
Faulkender and Petersen (2012) and documents a set of firms most affected by the elimination of 
U.S. repatriation taxes. Reducing internal capital market frictions does not appear to affect the 
relationship between foreign cash and either repurchases or capital expenditures for strong 
financial health firms. This is most likely due to their ability to generate cash from operations to 
fund their investments and/or their ability to borrow, reducing the reliance on foreign cash.  
We also examine whether the spending and investment of foreign cash is affected by the 
firms’ growth opportunities. Prior literature uses the market-to-book ratio to measure growth 
 
made up of large multinational firms which most likely causes a shift in the distribution to more positive Z-Score 
values. The marginally weak financial health firms are a relative comparison to other firms in our sample.  
18 Consistent with this notion, the correlation between Z-Score and Foreign Cash is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level (untabulated) suggesting that firms in stronger financial health (i.e., greater Z-Score) hold greater 
amounts of foreign cash.  
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opportunities (Faulkender and Petersen, 2012; Blouin and Krull, 2009). However, we are unable 
to disentangle domestic and foreign growth opportunities when using the firm-level market-to-
book ratio. The reduction in repatriation costs allows firms to use foreign cash to respond to 
domestic growth opportunities, whereas there should be little response to foreign growth 
opportunities. We indirectly proxy for domestic level growth opportunities by using the level of 
firm-level underinvestment as measured by Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi’s (2009) model of 
investment efficiency.19 Firms that historically underinvest are identified as firms with the 
greatest domestic growth opportunities. We reason that underinvestment captures domestic and 
not foreign growth opportunities because firms would have the ability to use pre-TCJA foreign 
cash to reduce foreign underinvestment. The results for repurchases and capital expenditures are 
presented in Table 6. For repurchases (columns 1 – 4), the coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post is 
positive and significant across the first three quartiles of growth opportunity measures. With the 
exception of the partition including high overinvestment/low growth opportunities, multinational 
firms used foreign cash balances to increase repurchases across all levels of growth 
opportunities. In columns 5 – 8, the dependent variable is capital expenditures, and the 
coefficient on Foreign Cash × Post is not significantly different from zero in all four partitions.  
Overall, the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that firms that were in a marginally 
weak financial position and had high levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash were most likely to 
increase post-TCJA repurchases and capital expenditures. Firms along the rest of the financial 
health continuum did not change their investment and spending behavior following the TCJA. In 
addition, growth opportunities do not appear to be the driving force behind the post-TCJA 
spending and investment decisions for multinationals’ foreign cash.  
 
19 Inferences are similar if we use the market-to-book ratio to proxy for growth opportunities.  
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5.4 Domestic and Foreign Capital Expenditures 
The only setting where we find an increase in total capital expenditures is for those firms that 
are in marginally weak financial health (Table 5). Our prior discussion develops why domestic 
investment may increase for these firms pre-TCJA. However, it is also possible that foreign 
capital expenditures increase post-TCJA. First, the TCJA introduces a GILTI inclusion to 
discourage income shifting from the U.S. to foreign jurisdictions and among foreign 
jurisdictions. Due to the nature of the calculation, in order to reduce U.S. tax liability associated 
with GILTI, firms can minimize their GILTI inclusion by increasing foreign investment in 
tangible assets. Second, De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008) show that pre-TCJA, firms should 
underinvest in foreign operating assets, using foreign earnings to grow to the optimal size and, 
therefore, avoiding U.S. repatriation taxes. Because the TCJA eliminates the option to defer U.S. 
repatriation taxes on foreign earnings, the TCJA also eliminates the advantages of the 
underinvestment strategy recommended in De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008). Therefore, firms 
may increase foreign capital expenditures following the passage of the TCJA in order to achieve 
the optimal size of operations. Firms are not required to disclose disaggregated capital 
expenditures. However, firms are required to include the net property, plant, and equipment 
levels for both domestic and foreign operations in their annual segment disclosures within their 
10-Ks (ASC 280-10-50-41).20 We hand-collect domestic and foreign net property, plant, and 
equipment for fiscal years ending during the period 2015 – 2018 for our sample. We use these 
hand-collected disclosures to compute changes in net domestic and foreign property, plant, and 
equipment from 2015 to 2016 and 2017 to 2018. We omit the 2016 to 2017 change because the 
 
20 The Computstat Segment database does provide foreign and domestic capital expenditures, but less than 10 
percent of firms in the database have data for these amounts due to inconsistent disclosure. Our approach of hand-
collecting domestic and foreign net property, plant, and equipment is an attempt to improve on prior literature’s 
challenge of measuring domestic versus foreign investment described in Dong, Cao, Zhao, Deshmukh (2019). 
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TCJA became effective in this period, and details were made public before the enactment. 
Therefore, our analysis compares the 2016 domestic/foreign capital expenditures with the 2018 
domestic/foreign capital expenditures. We limit our sample to marginally weak financial health 
firms based on the findings in Table 5.  
Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is 
domestic capital expenditures and foreign capital expenditures, respectively. The coefficient on 
Foreign Cash × Post is positive and significant in column 1 only. This suggests that the change 
in repatriation costs incentivized multinational firms that were marginally constrained to increase 
domestic capital expenditures rather than foreign capital expenditures.  
5.5 Difference-in-differences Analysis 
Our main findings provide evidence that multinational firms with greater foreign cash levels, 
compared to firms with lesser foreign cash levels, increased repurchases and some firms (i.e., 
those in marginally weak financial health) increased domestic capital expenditures. As discussed 
earlier, the TCJA consisted of several broad changes (e.g., statutory tax rate decrease, 100 
percent bonus depreciation, interest deductibility, and foreign earnings taxation). We argue that 
our findings are due to the change in the taxation of foreign earnings and not the other three 
broad changes. In order to provide stronger evidence for this conclusion, we use a difference-in-
differences research design that compares repurchases and capital expenditures of multinational 
firms (i.e., treatment group) to domestic-only firms (i.e., control group). Multinational and 
domestic firms are similarly affected by all broad TCJA changes except the taxation of foreign 
earnings. The change in the taxation of foreign earnings does not affect domestic firms. We use 
the following difference-in-differences model: 
Expenditurei,t = α0 + α1Postt + α2MNCi + α3MNCi × Postt + Controls + ε (2) 
23 
 
Expenditure takes the value of either Total Payout, Repurchases, CapEx, or Domestic 
CapEx, defined above. Post is defined above and MNC is equal to one if the firm reports foreign 
income in any period 2011 – 2013. Controls includes all of the same controls from equation (1). 
The estimated coefficients from equation (2) are presented in Table 8 Panel A for the full 
sample. The coefficient on MNC × Post is positive and significant when the dependent variable 
is Total Payout (column 1), Repurchases (column 2), and Domestic CapEX (column 4). These 
findings are consistent with the main findings and provide stronger evidence that multinational 
firms (i.e., firms with foreign cash most affected by the change in the taxation of foreign 
earnings) increase repurchases and domestic capital expenditures in the post-TCJA period. Table 
8 Panel B examines repurchases and domestic capital expenditures for a disaggregated sample 
based on financial health. We disaggregate the sample at the median Z-Score levels and include 
weak (strong) financial health firms in columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4). The dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) is Repurchases (Domestic CapEX). The coefficient on MNC × Post is 
positive and significant in the weak financial health firms only. This confirms the evidence 
presented in Table 5 when the sample only includes multinational firms. Overall, using a 
difference-in-differences research design confirms our inferences when limiting the sample to 
multinational firms only, and alleviates the concern that our results are due to TCJA changes 
other than the changes to the taxation of foreign earnings.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
The recent enactment of the TCJA is a significant change to U.S. corporate tax policy and in 
particular, significantly reduces repatriation costs of U.S. multinational companies. The TCJA 
provides a unique setting to examine whether firms increase capital investment or shareholder 
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payouts in response to a reduction in internal capital market frictions due to the elimination of 
repatriation costs. An intent underlying the TCJA is to enable firms to increase economic growth 
potentially through increased domestic capital investment. This study investigates whether a 
permanent reduction in repatriation costs created by the TCJA increases spending on shareholder 
payouts or capital expenditures for firms with higher levels of foreign cash. 
Consistent with findings from the prior literature (Blouin and Krull, 2009; Dharmapala et al., 
2011; Faulkender and Petersen, 2012; Arena and Kutner, 2015), we find no evidence of an 
increase in capital expenditures post-TCJA for firms with higher levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash 
in the broad cross-section, but we do find evidence of an increase in capital expenditures post-
TCJA for firms with higher levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash when these firms are in marginally 
weak financial health. We further document that this increase in capital expenditures is a result 
of domestic capital expenditures and not foreign capital expenditures. Additionally, we find 
evidence consistent with an increase in shareholder payouts post-TCJA for firms with higher 
levels of pre-TCJA foreign cash, and we find firms used share repurchases rather than dividends 
to return cash to shareholders post-TCJA; this result is concentrated in firms with marginally 
weak financial health as well, and as expected, in firms with high pre-TCJA repatriation costs. 
We also provide additional analysis using a difference-in-differences model, comparing post-
TCJA multinational firm expenditures to post-TCJA domestic-only firm expenditures, to ensure 
our findings are driven by the reduction in repatriation costs and not the other changes included 
in the TCJA (statutory tax rate decrease, 100 percent bonus depreciation, and/or interest 
deductibility). The results from the analyses are consistent with our main results confirming our 
conjecture.  
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We make several contributions to the literature. First, our findings should be of use to 
policymakers as they evaluate the effectiveness of the TCJA in encouraging domestic capital 
investment. The TCJA created a significant debate regarding its ability to increase domestic 
investment. Our findings indicate that domestic investment increases only for firms who are in 
marginally weak financial health. Second, prior research examines the investment consequences 
of the AJCA and tax reform in both the United Kingdom and Japan, and our results add to this 
existing stream of literature. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the effect of taxes on firm 
decision-making. Our findings imply that taxes influence managers’ investment decisions.
26 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aharony, J., and I. Swary. 1980. Quarterly dividend and earnings announcements and 
stockholders’ returns: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 35 (1): 1–12. 
Albring, S. M. 2006. The effects of the cost of foreign internal funds on the probability that a 
firm issues domestic debt. Journal of American Tax Association 28 (1): 25–41. 
Allen, F., and R. Michaely. 2003. Payout policy. In: Constantinides, G., Harris, M., Stulz, R. 
(Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance. North-Holland, Amsterdam: 337–429. 
Altman, E. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23 (4): 589–609. 
Amberger, H. J., K. S. Markle, and D. M. P. Samuel. 2018. Repatriation taxes, internal agency 
conflicts and subsidiary-level investment efficiency. Working paper available at SSRN: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3138823. 
Arena, M. P., and G. W. Kutner. 2015. Territorial tax system reform and corporate financial 
policies. Review of Financial Studies 28 (8): 2250–2280. 
Beyer, B., J. Downes, and E. T. Rapley. 2017. Internal capital market inefficiencies, shareholder 
payout, and abnormal leverage. Journal of Corporate Finance 43: 39–57. 
Biddle, G. C., G. Hilary, and R. S.Verdi. 2009. How does financial reporting quality relate to 
investment efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2–3): 112–131. 
Billett, M. T., and D. C. Mauer. 2003. Cross-subsidies, external financing constraints, and the 
contribution of internal capital markets to firm value. Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 
1167–1201. 
Bjornsen, M., J. F. Downes, and T. C. Omer. 2019. The consequences of deviating from 
financial reporting industry norms: Evidence from the disclosure of foreign cash. 
Working paper available at SSRN: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2832216. 
Blaylock, B., J. F. Downes, M. Mathis, and S. White. 2019. The effect of repatriation taxes on 
bond pricing: Evidence from the 2016 election. Working paper. 
Bloomberg. 2017. These are the corporate winners and losers in the GOP’s final tax bill 
<http://fortune.com/2017/12/16/gop-tax-bill-winners-and-losers/> 
Blouin, J. L., and L. K. Krull. 2009. Bringing it home: A study of the incentives surrounding the 
repatriation of foreign earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Journal 
of Accounting Research 47 (4): 1027–1059. 
Brav, A., J. Graham, C. Harvey, and R. Michaely. 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. 
Journal of Financial Economics 77 (3): 483–527. 
Canace, T. G., S. B. Jackson, and T. Ma. 2018. R&D investments, capital expenditures, and 
earnings thresholds. Review of Accounting Studies 23 (1): 265–295. 
27 
 
Clemons, R., and T. Shevlin. 2016. Tax policy debate: increasing the policy impact of academic 
tax accounting research. Journal of the American Taxation Association 38 (1): 29–37. 
Datta, S., R. D’Mello, and M. Iskandar-Datta. 2009. Executive compensation and internal capital 
market efficiency. Journal of Financial Intermediation 18 (2): 242–258. 
Davis, L., and S. Chandra. 2018. U.S. cash repatriation plunges 50%, defying Trump’s tax 
forecast. Bloomberg News December 19. 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and R. Stulz. 2006. Dividend policy and the earned/contributed 
capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial Economics 81 (2): 227–
254. 
Desai, M. A., C. F. Foley, and J. R. Hines. 2007. Dividend policy inside the multinational firm. 
Financial Management 36 (1): 5–26. 
De Simone, L., and R. Lester. 2018. The effect of foreign cash holdings on internal capital 
markets and firm financing (October 22, 2018). Stanford University Graduate School of 
Business Research Paper No. 18–32. Working paper available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199295. 
De Waegenaere, A., and R. Sansing. 2008. Taxation of international investment and accounting 
valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (4): 2299–2336. 
Dharmapala, D., C. F. Foley, and K. J. Forbes. 2011. Watch what I do, not what I say: The 
unintended consequences of the Homeland Investment Act. Journal of Finance 66 (3): 
753–787. 
Dong, Q., Y. Cao, X. Zhao, A. Deshmukh. 2019. Responses of US multinational firms to a 
temporary repatriation tax holiday: A literature review and synthesis. Journal of 
Accounting Literature forthcoming. 
Edwards, A., T. Kravet, and R. Wilson. 2016. Trapped cash and the profitability of foreign cash 
acquisitions. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1): 44–77. 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 2001. Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or 
lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60 (1): 3–43 
Faulkender, M., and M. Petersen. 2012. Investment and capital constraints: Repatriations under 
the American Jobs Creation Act. Review of Financial Studies 25 (11): 3351–3388. 
Foley, C. F., J. C. Hartzell, S. Titman, and G. Twite. 2007. Why do firms hold so much cash? A 
tax-based explanation. Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3): 579–607. 
Garber, J. 2017. Here’s what America’s biggest companies plan to do with all that cash come 
back to the U.S. Business Insider December 20. 
GDP Ranked by Country 2019. World Population Review, 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-gdp/. 
Graham, J. R., M. Hanlon, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Barriers to mobility: The lockout effect of U.S. 
taxation of worldwide corporate profits. National Tax Journal 63 (4): 1111–1144. 
28 
 
Grullon, G., B. Paye, S. Underwood, and J. P. Weston. 2011. Has the propensity to pay out 
declined? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46 (1): 1–24. 
Guay, W., and J. Harford. 2000. The cash-flow permanence and information content of dividend 
increases versus repurchase. Journal of Financial Economics 57: 385–415. 
Hanlon, M., J. L. Hoopes, and J. B. Slemrod. 2018. Tax reform made me do it! (November 5, 
2018). Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 18-36. Working paper 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279253. 
Hanlon, M., R. Lester, and R. Verdi. 2015. The effect of repatriation tax costs on U.S. 
multinational investment. Journal of Financial Economics 116 (1): 179–196. 
Hope, O.-K., and W. Thomas. 2008. Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting Research 46 (3): 591–626. 
Jagannathan, M., C. Stephens, and M. Weisbach. 2000. Financial flexibility and the choice 
between dividends and stock repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics. 56 (3): 355–
384. 
Jensen, M. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. The American 
Economic Review 76 (2): 323–329. 
Laplante S., K., and W. L. Nesbit. 2017. The relation among trapped cash, permanently 
reinvested earnings, and foreign cash. Journal of Corporate Finance 44: 126–148. 
Lattman, P., and P. Eavis. 2013. To satisfy its investors, cash-rich Apple borrows money. New 
York Times, April 30. 
Mead, C., and D. Kucera. 2012. eBay skirts cash repatriation with bond issue: Corporate finance. 
Bloomberg. 
Myers, S. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance 39 (3): 574–592.  
Myers, S., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing decisions when firms have investment 
information that investors do not. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 187–221. 
Nessa, M. L. 2017. Repatriation tax costs and U.S. multinational companies’ shareholder 
payouts. The Accounting Review 92 (4): 217–241. 
Nevius, A. M. 2017. How tax overhaul would change business taxes. Journal of Accountancy.  
PR Newswire. 2019. S&P 500 Q4 2018 buybacks set 4th consecutive quarterly record at $223 
billion; 2018 sets record $806 billion. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sp-
500-q4-2018-buybacks-set-4th-consecutive-quarterly-record-at-223-billion-2018-sets-
record-806-billion-300817734.html (last accessed 5/10/19) 
Shin, H., and R. M. Stulz. 1998. Are internal capital markets efficient? Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113 (2): 531–552. 
Shyam-Sunders, L., and S. Myers. 1999. Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of 
capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (2): 219–244. 
29 
 
Slemrod, J. 2018. Is this tax reform or just confusion? Journal of Economic Perspectives 32 (4): 
73–96. 
Stein, J. C. 1997. Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources. Journal of 
Finance 52 (1): 111–134. 
Weston, J. F. 1970. Mergers and acquisitions in business planning, Rivista Int. Sci. Econ. Com., 
(April): 309–320. 
Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, Inc. New York. 
Whitehouse.gov. 2018. The tax cuts and jobs act. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/WH_CuttingTaxesForAmericanWorkers_Feb2018.pdf 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
  N Mean St. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Total Payout 1,200 0.057 0.079 0.003 0.029 0.078 
Dividends 1,200 0.016 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.023 
Repurchases 1,200 0.041 0.069 0.000 0.014 0.050 
CapEx 1,200 0.042 0.043 0.017 0.030 0.053 
Post 1,200 0.333 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Foreign Cash 1,200 0.084 0.085 0.025 0.056 0.110 
Domestic Cash 1,200 0.117 0.154 0.015 0.056 0.159 
Book ETR 1,200 0.211 0.195 0.055 0.203 0.293 
Cash ETR 1,200 0.198 0.190 0.053 0.179 0.271 
Loss 1,200 0.230 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size 1,200 7.713 1.736 6.580 7.766 8.869 
Earnings 1,200 0.036 0.129 0.009 0.049 0.089 
Cash Flow 1,200 0.105 0.105 0.059 0.101 0.151 
Leverage 1,200 0.229 0.177 0.079 0.223 0.346 
MTB 1,200 3.944 11.300 1.758 2.884 4.796 
Sales Growth 1,200 0.053 0.180 -0.038 0.043 0.124 
CapEx 2014 1,200 0.039 0.036 0.017 0.029 0.050 
RD 1,200 0.056 0.090 0.000 0.018 0.071 
ACQ 1,200 0.051 0.128 0.000 0.001 0.035 
Firm Age 1,200 3.682 0.535 3.401 3.714 4.143 
RE/BV 1,200 0.167 3.770 -0.104 0.477 0.922 
Returns 1,200 0.023 0.357 -0.220 0.009 0.218 
Options 1,200 0.013 0.106 -0.022 0.000 0.015 
St. Dev. Earnings 1,200 0.041 0.047 0.012 0.025 0.054 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the main sample of firm-year observations for the period 2015 – 2018, 
excluding the year 2017. The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as the scalar in the following variable 
definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. Dividends is total dividends paid scaled by total 
assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases are total repurchases scaled by total 
assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases of common and preferred stock less any decrease 
in the redemption value of preferred stock in the prior year, or minus the decrease in preferred stock in the prior 
year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Post is equal to one for 
fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. Foreign Cash is foreign cash at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by 
total assets. Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign cash at the end of 2014, scaled by total assets. Book ETR is 
current federal tax expense scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. 
Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 
2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income before extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal to operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Leverage is long term debt at 
the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding divided by the total 
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book value. Sales Growth is total sales minus lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 
2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. RD is equal to research and development expense scaled by total 
assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on mergers and 
acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to book 
value of common equity. Returns is monthly compounded stock return for the two years prior to period t. Options is 
the annual percentage change in total diluted shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made during year 
t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. Continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Total Payout  0.569 0.886 0.018 0.244 0.100 -0.099 0.180 0.278 -0.410 0.292 0.526 
2 Dividends 0.488  0.245 0.055 0.100 0.032 -0.232 0.184 0.246 -0.351 0.345 0.381 
3 Repurchases 0.933 0.164  -0.011 0.194 0.110 -0.040 0.138 0.216 -0.331 0.216 0.434 
4 CapEx 0.016 0.004 0.018  -0.013 0.097 0.054 -0.013 -0.063 -0.079 0.114 0.132 
5 Foreign Cash 0.242 0.050 0.260 -0.062  0.000 0.014 0.015 0.177 -0.158 -0.028 0.277 
6 Post 0.119 0.058 0.112 0.110 0.000  0.000 -0.185 -0.043 -0.025 0.052 0.129 
7 Domestic Cash 0.010 -0.152 0.065 0.106 -0.111 0.000  -0.181 -0.246 0.268 -0.295 -0.154 
8 Book ETR 0.030 0.034 0.024 -0.046 0.028 -0.119 -0.192  0.482 -0.308 0.085 0.224 
9 Cash ETR 0.095 0.092 0.073 -0.079 0.085 -0.021 -0.214 0.452  -0.385 0.131 0.301 
10 Loss -0.256 -0.266 -0.195 -0.026 -0.137 -0.025 0.346 -0.096 -0.160  -0.286 -0.729 
11 Size 0.197 0.254 0.140 0.111 -0.029 0.046 -0.370 0.032 0.065 -0.304  0.252 
12 Earnings 0.384 0.262 0.342 0.015 0.209 0.120 -0.290 0.154 0.183 -0.676 0.296  
13 Cash Flow 0.483 0.283 0.446 0.286 0.185 0.125 -0.071 0.080 0.065 -0.424 0.264 0.636 
14 Leverage 0.006 0.076 -0.013 0.056 -0.180 0.071 -0.351 0.012 -0.015 -0.115 0.412 0.050 
15 MTB 0.089 0.055 0.078 0.016 -0.058 0.013 0.041 -0.002 -0.023 -0.019 0.049 0.068 
16 Sales Growth 0.008 -0.062 0.040 0.183 -0.022 0.177 0.246 -0.066 -0.119 -0.074 0.005 0.090 
17 CapEx 2014 0.013 0.022 0.010 0.819 -0.072 0.064 0.065 -0.051 -0.089 0.040 0.110 -0.021 
18 RD 0.065 -0.072 0.099 0.097 0.044 0.070 0.543 -0.235 -0.226 0.272 -0.241 -0.264 
19 ACQ -0.004 0.031 -0.008 0.001 0.011 0.031 -0.020 0.003 0.016 -0.047 0.066 0.019 
20 Firm Age 0.108 0.293 0.019 -0.072 0.099 0.123 -0.393 0.098 0.126 -0.264 0.344 0.238 
21 RE/BV 0.131 0.089 0.118 -0.016 0.063 -0.020 -0.132 0.085 0.078 -0.189 0.162 0.157 
22 Returns -0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.059 0.027 -0.251 -0.030 0.039 -0.019 -0.166 0.002 0.156 
23 Options -0.072 0.004 -0.094 0.073 -0.064 0.003 0.145 -0.052 -0.112 0.079 -0.080 -0.082 
24 St. Dev. Earnings 0.024 -0.082 0.045 0.053 0.006 0.096 0.261 -0.139 -0.167 0.414 -0.189 -0.318 
25 Dividends t-1 0.409 0.886 0.138 0.000 0.047 0.048 -0.171 0.038 0.099 -0.250 0.236 0.235 
26 Repurchases t-1 0.612 0.157 0.643 -0.030 0.280 -0.034 -0.004 0.044 0.066 -0.205 0.152 0.317 
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  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 Total Payout 0.441 0.026 0.338 -0.018 0.004 -0.035 0.088 0.214 0.397 0.006 -0.505 -0.172 0.522 0.669 
2 Dividends 0.231 0.138 0.186 -0.106 0.052 -0.180 0.074 0.402 0.397 0.036 -0.256 -0.241 0.943 0.254 
3 Repurchases 0.386 -0.009 0.288 0.004 -0.029 0.020 0.097 0.101 0.287 -0.027 -0.516 -0.115 0.209 0.708 
4 CapEx 0.330 0.072 0.137 0.175 0.868 0.048 -0.015 -0.008 -0.080 -0.044 0.102 0.057 0.034 -0.013 
5 Foreign Cash 0.207 -0.212 0.090 -0.030 -0.014 0.190 0.030 0.141 0.162 0.031 -0.126 0.080 0.091 0.231 
6 Post 0.091 0.073 0.078 0.259 0.051 0.027 -0.011 0.126 0.028 -0.275 0.083 0.168 0.027 0.018 
7 Domestic Cash -0.017 -0.394 0.093 0.195 0.041 0.370 -0.107 -0.313 -0.256 -0.008 0.270 0.292 -0.237 -0.071 
8 Book ETR 0.155 0.022 -0.016 -0.057 -0.016 -0.341 0.059 0.123 0.233 0.131 -0.196 -0.300 0.178 0.154 
9 Cash ETR 0.159 0.017 0.062 -0.091 -0.077 -0.263 0.136 0.160 0.286 0.065 -0.283 -0.283 0.239 0.195 
10 Loss -0.453 -0.124 -0.222 -0.133 -0.003 0.171 -0.163 -0.219 -0.366 -0.191 0.246 0.428 -0.313 -0.306 
11 Size 0.189 0.451 0.189 -0.002 0.102 -0.243 0.144 0.355 0.326 -0.002 -0.294 -0.202 0.331 0.232 
12 Earnings 0.670 0.013 0.370 0.221 0.058 -0.029 0.151 0.201 0.416 0.168 -0.219 -0.198 0.341 0.387 
13 Cash Flow  0.042 0.364 0.289 0.272 0.079 0.138 0.001 0.224 0.190 -0.095 -0.084 0.205 0.352 
14 Leverage 0.047  0.086 -0.051 0.063 -0.270 0.007 0.125 0.101 -0.017 -0.116 -0.145 0.151 0.006 
15 MTB 0.075 -0.028  0.233 0.087 0.230 0.112 -0.057 0.098 -0.054 -0.009 -0.062 0.166 0.226 
16 Sales Growth 0.217 -0.011 0.079  0.028 0.197 0.188 -0.198 -0.064 0.070 0.344 0.000 -0.129 -0.073 
17 CapEx 2014 0.258 0.060 0.010 0.028  0.034 -0.069 0.005 -0.077 -0.038 0.057 0.110 0.046 -0.009 
18 RD 0.053 -0.268 0.104 0.215 0.104  -0.041 -0.130 -0.208 0.024 0.222 0.255 -0.188 0.001 
19 ACQ 0.112 -0.009 0.025 0.271 -0.040 0.095  0.039 0.112 0.000 -0.011 -0.186 0.060 0.110 
20 Firm Age 0.024 0.092 -0.041 -0.241 -0.047 -0.263 -0.011  0.412 -0.013 -0.230 -0.154 0.419 0.138 
21 RE/BV 0.155 0.020 0.117 0.019 -0.024 -0.187 0.034 0.150  0.067 -0.335 -0.260 0.393 0.317 
22 Returns 0.167 -0.009 -0.016 0.082 -0.042 -0.011 -0.009 -0.013 0.048  0.014 -0.100 0.037 0.090 
23 Options -0.040 -0.048 0.048 0.281 0.021 0.141 0.128 -0.100 -0.052 0.016  0.223 -0.248 -0.556 
24 St. Dev. Earnings -0.061 -0.127 -0.036 -0.013 0.105 0.369 -0.001 -0.182 -0.109 -0.065 0.105  -0.233 -0.131 
25 Dividends t-1 0.241 0.099 0.034 -0.081 0.027 -0.094 0.018 0.308 0.085 -0.013 -0.025 -0.098  0.236 
26 Repurchases t-1 0.402 0.009 0.013 -0.045 -0.013 0.054 0.009 0.056 0.110 0.069 -0.127 -0.017 0.140  
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This table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal. All correlations that are bold and italicized are significant at the 10 percent 
level. The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as the scalar in the following variable definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. 
Dividends is total dividends paid scaled by total assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases are total repurchases scaled by 
total assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases of common and preferred stock less any decrease in the redemption value of preferred 
stock in the prior year, or minus the decrease in preferred stock in the prior year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. Foreign Cash is foreign cash at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. 
Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign cash at the end of 2014, scaled by total assets. Book ETR is current federal tax expense scaled by pretax income minus 
special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal 
year 2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income before extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at 
the end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal to operating cash flow scaled by total assets. 
Leverage is long term debt at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding divided by the total book value. Sales 
Growth is total sales minus lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. RD is equal to 
research and development expense scaled by total assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on mergers and 
acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been 
in Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to book value of common equity. Returns is monthly compounded stock return for the two years prior to 
period t. Options is the annual percentage change in total diluted shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made during year t. St. Dev. Earnings is the 
standard deviation of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
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Table 3 
The use of foreign cash following the TCJA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Payout Dividends Repurchases CapEx 
     
Post 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.006*** 
 (0.79) (0.16) (1.03) (2.79) 
Foreign Cash 0.037 -0.009 0.040 0.007 
 (1.43) (-0.90) (1.53) (0.78) 
Foreign Cash × Post 0.126* 0.009 0.116* -0.023 
 (1.95) (0.66) (1.78) (-1.55) 
Domestic Cash 0.071*** -0.003 0.072*** 0.018** 
 (2.90) (-0.47) (3.02) (2.32) 
Book ETR -0.006 0.001 -0.004 0.002 
 (-0.63) (0.22) (-0.38) (0.72) 
Cash ETR 0.017 0.002 0.015 0.003 
 (1.56) (0.54) (1.27) (0.91) 
Loss -0.009 -0.008*** -0.010 -0.006* 
 (-1.31) (-3.33) (-1.49) (-1.84) 
Size 0.003* 0.002*** 0.002 0.001 
 (1.85) (2.99) (1.47) (1.37) 
Earnings 0.035 -0.005 0.038 -0.026 
 (0.73) (-0.50) (0.88) (-1.35) 
Cash Flow 0.189*** 0.034** 0.164*** 0.039** 
 (4.67) (2.24) (4.45) (2.05) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.011*** 0.005 -0.004 
 (-0.34) (-2.61) (0.34) (-0.77) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.32) (0.75) (1.03) (0.38) 
Sales Growth -0.025* -0.008 -0.015 0.028*** 
 (-1.72) (-1.38) (-1.24) (5.12) 
CapEx 2014 -0.174** -0.047** -0.144* 0.933*** 
 (-2.42) (-2.09) (-1.95) (16.41) 
RD -0.018 -0.027** -0.007 -0.024* 
 (-0.50) (-2.57) (-0.19) (-1.66) 
ACQ -0.017 0.005 -0.015 -0.002 
 (-1.34) (1.29) (-1.18) (-0.48) 
Firm Age 0.008* 0.004* 0.006  
 (1.80) (1.93) (1.43)  
RE/BV 0.001 0.000 0.001*  
 (1.62) (0.47) (1.67)  
Returns -0.013** 0.002 -0.018***  
 (-2.42) (1.05) (-3.27)  
Options -0.003 0.010 -0.028  
 (-0.16) (1.59) (-1.35)  
St. Dev. Earnings 0.158*** 0.005 0.129**  
 (2.84) (0.28) (2.50)  
Dividends Lag 0.932*** 1.063*** -0.064  
 (7.66) (16.94) (-0.64)  
Repurchase Lag 0.593*** -0.012 0.624***  
 (10.99) (-0.96) (11.70)  
Intercept -0.065*** -0.028*** -0.070*** -0.010 
 (-3.01) (-2.64) (-2.89) (-1.15) 
N 1200 1200 1200 1200 
adj. R2    0.7133 
Log Likelihood 1383.798 1438.774 1197.879 2842.585 
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This table presents estimates from panel regressions on a sample of multinational firms explaining firm-level annual 
expenditure for the period 2015 – 2018, excluding 2017. The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as the scalar in 
the following variable definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. Dividends is total 
dividends paid scaled by total assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases are 
total repurchases scaled by total assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases of common and 
preferred stock less any decrease in the redemption value of preferred stock in the prior year, or minus the decrease 
in preferred stock in the prior year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. Foreign Cash is foreign cash at the end of 
fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign cash at the end of 2014, scaled by 
total assets. Book ETR is current federal tax expense scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the 
end of fiscal year 2014. Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at 
the end of fiscal year 2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income before extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to 
zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before 
extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal to operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Leverage 
is long term debt at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding 
divided by the total book value. Sales Growth is total sales minus lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 
is total fiscal year 2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. RD is equal to research and development expense 
scaled by total assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on 
mergers and acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to 
book value of common equity. Returns is monthly compounded stock return for the two years prior to period t. 
Options is the annual percentage change in total diluted shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made 
during year t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects are 
included. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 two-tailed significance levels.  
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Table 4 
Repatriation costs and the use of foreign cash following the TCJA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Repurchases  
High Repat Costs 
Repurchases  
Low Repat Costs 
CapEx 
High Repat Costs 
CapEx 
Low Repat Costs 
     
Post -0.008 0.016** 0.004 0.008** 
 (-0.79) (2.29) (1.29) (2.55) 
Foreign Cash 0.060* 0.058 -0.009 0.029* 
 (1.86) (0.95) (-0.89) (1.71) 
Foreign Cash × Post 0.193** -0.038 -0.008 -0.056 
 (2.50) (-0.36) (-0.50) (-1.47) 
Domestic Cash 0.007 0.103*** 0.011 0.020** 
 (0.25) (3.06) (0.67) (2.07) 
Book ETR -0.014 0.010 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.96) (0.72) (0.67) (0.61) 
Cash ETR 0.010 0.020 0.008 0.001 
 (0.65) (1.29) (0.98) (0.39) 
Loss -0.019* -0.003 -0.007* -0.003 
 (-1.76) (-0.33) (-1.72) (-0.66) 
Size 0.003* 0.000 -0.000 0.002** 
 (1.92) (0.19) (-0.43) (2.09) 
Earnings -0.048 0.109** -0.009 -0.032 
 (-0.80) (2.47) (-0.52) (-1.22) 
Cash Flow 0.232*** 0.125*** 0.018 0.048* 
 (3.85) (3.39) (0.72) (1.83) 
Leverage 0.026 0.014 -0.007 -0.004 
 (1.22) (0.71) (-0.92) (-0.57) 
MTB -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.08) (0.68) (0.75) (-0.26) 
Sales Growth -0.024 -0.007 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (-1.14) (-0.49) (4.17) (3.84) 
CapEx 2014 -0.081 -0.159* 0.783*** 0.990*** 
 (-0.64) (-1.76) (10.78) (11.36) 
RD 0.035 -0.035 -0.013 -0.028 
 (0.62) (-0.80) (-0.70) (-1.43) 
ACQ -0.013 -0.026 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.84) (-1.46) (-0.36) (-0.13) 
Firm Age 0.005 0.007   
 (0.64) (1.46)   
RE/BV 0.003*** 0.000   
 (3.17) (0.42)   
Returns -0.022** -0.018***   
 (-2.16) (-3.05)   
Options -0.034 -0.033   
 (-1.21) (-1.19)   
St. Dev. Earnings 0.056 0.195***   
 (0.69) (2.78)   
Dividends Lag -0.028 -0.073   
 (-0.22) (-0.54)   
Repurchase Lag 0.535*** 0.689***   
 (7.88) (8.20)   
Intercept -0.075* -0.080** 0.005 -0.023** 
 (-1.78) (-2.57) (0.28) (-2.15) 
N 600 600 600 600 
adj. R2   0.6497 0.7599 
Log Likelihood 634.652 607.659 1477.588 1409.601 
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This table presents estimates from panel regressions on a sample of multinational firms explaining firm-level annual 
expenditure for the period 2015 – 2018, excluding 2017. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) include firms that have greater 
or equal (less than) the sample median of repatriation costs (0.0046). The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as 
the scalar in the following variable definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. Dividends is 
total dividends paid scaled by total assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases 
are total repurchases scaled by total assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases of common 
and preferred stock less any decrease in the redemption value of preferred stock in the prior year, or minus the 
decrease in preferred stock in the prior year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled 
by total assets. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. Foreign Cash is foreign cash at 
the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign cash at the end of 2014, 
scaled by total assets. Book ETR is current federal tax expense scaled by pretax income minus special items, 
measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled by pretax income minus special 
items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income before extraordinary items is less 
than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2014. 
Earnings is income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal to operating cash flow 
scaled by total assets. Leverage is long term debt at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. MTB is market 
value of shares outstanding divided by the total book value. Sales Growth is total sales minus lagged sales, scaled by 
lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. RD is equal to research 
and development expense scaled by total assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. ACQ is equal to 
total expenditures on mergers and acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to zero when missing in 
Compustat. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in Compustat. RE/BV is the 
ratio of retained earnings to book value of common equity. Returns is monthly compounded stock return for the two 
years prior to period t. Options is the annual percentage change in total diluted shares outstanding of firm as if no 
repurchases were made during year t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation of earnings for the current and 
previous 4 years. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Two-digit SIC code industry fixed 
effects are included. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 two-tailed significance levels. 
 
  
39 
 
Table 5 
Financial health and the use of foreign cash following the TCJA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Repurchases CapEx 
 Weak 
Health 
Marginal 
Weak Health 
Marginal 
Strong Health 
Strong 
Health 
Weak 
Health 
Marginal 
Weak Health 
Marginal 
Strong Health 
Strong 
Health 
         
Post 0.009 -0.002 0.009 0.027*** 0.008** -0.003 0.007 0.021** 
 (1.32) (-0.26) (1.10) (2.67) (2.36) (-0.75) (1.08) (2.16) 
Foreign Cash 0.132** -0.036 0.005 0.062 0.055 -0.037** 0.034 -0.015 
 (2.10) (-0.73) (0.13) (1.40) (1.59) (-2.33) (0.98) (-0.52) 
Foreign Cash × Post -0.053 0.127* 0.009 -0.062 -0.026 0.069** -0.056 -0.096 
 (-0.62) (1.87) (0.13) (-0.80) (-0.36) (2.49) (-1.12) (-1.57) 
Domestic Cash 0.064** 0.053** 0.022 0.062** -0.005 0.019 0.035 0.004 
 (2.08) (2.17) (0.63) (2.24) (-0.21) (1.15) (1.21) (0.18) 
Book ETR -0.014 -0.004 0.027 0.028 0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.002 
 (-1.51) (-0.43) (1.19) (1.50) (0.44) (1.24) (-0.26) (0.15) 
Cash ETR -0.004 0.001 0.017 0.008 0.002 -0.003 0.010 -0.006 
 (-0.47) (0.10) (1.05) (0.35) (0.25) (-0.51) (1.18) (-0.68) 
Loss -0.011 0.017** -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.027*** 
 (-1.59) (2.32) (-0.48) (-0.67) (-0.75) (0.21) (0.32) (-2.60) 
Size 0.000 0.004** 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.003* 0.002 
 (0.15) (2.39) (1.56) (1.46) (-0.13) (0.89) (1.79) (0.90) 
Earnings -0.031 0.153*** 0.036 0.025 -0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.054 
 (-0.71) (3.61) (1.00) (0.54) (-0.40) (0.31) (0.00) (-1.03) 
Cash Flow 0.148** 0.103** 0.102* 0.095 0.031 0.023 0.026 0.007 
 (2.53) (2.43) (1.71) (1.50) (0.90) (0.78) (0.29) (0.13) 
Leverage 0.037* -0.013 -0.029 0.035 -0.006 0.004 -0.021 0.001 
 (1.95) (-0.74) (-1.33) (1.21) (-0.44) (0.42) (-1.40) (0.05) 
MTB 0.000 -0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.003*** 0.001 
 (0.39) (-0.25) (4.03) (0.64) (0.26) (-0.36) (2.67) (0.74) 
Sales Growth 0.056*** -0.009 0.020 -0.075** 0.021* 0.016* 0.054*** 0.074*** 
 (3.47) (-0.46) (0.74) (-2.41) (1.74) (1.66) (4.33) (3.44) 
CapEx 2014 -0.197*** -0.026 -0.104 -0.043 0.938*** 1.021*** 0.972*** 1.098*** 
 (-3.05) (-0.27) (-0.85) (-0.30) (11.40) (7.71) (7.66) (8.20) 
RD 0.032 0.024 -0.023 0.049 0.008 -0.025 -0.029 -0.041 
 (0.53) (0.43) (-0.33) (0.96) (0.19) (-1.04) (-0.55) (-0.85) 
ACQ -0.048* -0.023 -0.017 -0.010 -0.025 0.010 -0.023 -0.033 
 (-1.76) (-0.93) (-0.51) (-0.23) (-1.02) (0.83) (-1.33) (-1.33) 
Firm Age -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.019*     
 (-1.40) (-0.02) (-0.60) (1.93)     
RE/BV 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.002     
 (1.00) (0.21) (-0.94) (0.70)     
Returns -0.009 -0.013* -0.028*** -0.006     
 (-1.44) (-1.93) (-3.16) (-0.55)     
Options -0.234*** -0.455*** -0.477*** -0.189**     
 (-4.58) (-5.20) (-3.62) (-2.05)     
St. Dev. Earnings 0.069 0.006 -0.037 0.008     
 (0.97) (0.07) (-0.42) (0.07)     
Dividends Lag 0.422* -0.087 -0.161 -0.516*** 0.100 0.040 -0.412** -0.143 
 (1.80) (-0.58) (-0.93) (-3.00) (0.48) (0.53) (-2.57) (-1.54) 
Repurchase Lag 0.287*** 0.401*** 0.300*** 0.572*** -0.071** -0.015 -0.089* -0.015 
 (2.97) (4.92) (3.00) (7.30) (-2.11) (-0.63) (-1.76) (-0.37) 
Intercept 0.021 -0.029 -0.083** -0.351*** 0.002 -0.005 -0.032 -0.014 
 (0.63) (-0.97) (-2.02) (-7.11) (0.09) (-0.50) (-1.27) (-0.67) 
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
adj. R2     0.7070 0.7383 0.6585 0.6111 
Log Likelihood 1350.767 1470.973 1464.445 1396.396 714.192 849.811 702.679 628.841 
 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions on a sample of multinational firms explaining firm-level annual 
expenditure for the period 2015 – 2018, excluding 2017. The dependent variable in Columns 1 – 4 and 5 – 8 is 
Repurchases and CapEx. Columns 1 – 4 and 5 – 8 are disaggregated by the quartile cutoffs of firm-level Z-Score. 
The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as the scalar in the following variable definitions. Total Payout is the 
sum of Dividends and Repurchases. Dividends is total dividends paid scaled by total assets, set equal to zero when 
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dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases are total repurchases scaled by total assets. A repurchase is 
identified as a positive value for purchases of common and preferred stock less any decrease in the redemption value 
of preferred stock in the prior year, or minus the decrease in preferred stock in the prior year, if the redemption value 
is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018, 
zero otherwise. Foreign Cash is foreign cash at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. Domestic Cash is 
total cash minus foreign cash at the end of 2014, scaled by total assets. Book ETR is current federal tax expense 
scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Cash ETR is current taxes 
paid scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Loss is equal to 1 when 
income before extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets at the end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Cash Flow 
is equal to operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Leverage is long term debt at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled 
by total assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding divided by the total book value. Sales Growth is total 
sales minus lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 2014 capital expenditures scaled by 
total assets. RD is equal to research and development expense scaled by total assets. RD is equal to zero when 
missing in Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on mergers and acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is 
equal to zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has 
been in Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to book value of common equity. Returns is monthly 
compounded stock return for the two years prior to period t. Options is the annual percentage change in total diluted 
shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made during year t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation 
of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects are included. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 two-
tailed significance levels. 
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Table 6 
Investment opportunities and the use of foreign cash following the TCJA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Repurchases CapEx 
 Under 
Investment 
Marginal 
Under  
Investment 
Marginal 
Over  
Investment 
Over 
Investment 
Under 
Investment 
Marginal 
Under  
Investment 
Marginal 
Over  
Investment 
Over  
Investment 
         
Post -0.014 -0.006 -0.022** 0.001 0.005* 0.002 0.009 0.006 
 (-0.92) (-0.61) (-2.08) (0.08) (1.79) (0.55) (1.65) (1.45) 
Foreign Cash 0.042 0.061 0.013 -0.015 0.001 -0.031* -0.004 0.036 
 (0.64) (1.54) (0.28) (-0.24) (0.10) (-1.93) (-0.23) (1.47) 
Foreign Cash × Post 0.211* 0.263** 0.334** 0.095 -0.012 0.018 -0.027 -0.031 
 (1.89) (2.15) (2.07) (0.65) (-0.72) (0.74) (-0.98) (-0.70) 
Domestic Cash 0.105** 0.068* 0.054 0.022 0.014 0.006 0.018 0.031** 
 (2.47) (1.93) (1.18) (0.53) (1.08) (0.30) (0.58) (2.17) 
Book ETR 0.075*** -0.014 -0.025 -0.005 0.001 -0.010 0.011 -0.001 
 (3.05) (-0.72) (-1.39) (-0.34) (0.21) (-1.11) (1.56) (-0.14) 
Cash ETR -0.031 0.024 -0.024 0.021 0.006 0.011 -0.012* -0.001 
 (-1.08) (1.42) (-1.35) (1.18) (1.05) (1.41) (-1.96) (-0.09) 
Loss -0.024 -0.012 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-1.43) (-1.09) (0.06) (-0.26) (-1.48) (-0.95) (-1.12) (-1.00) 
Size 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (1.16) (0.59) (1.57) (1.13) (-0.79) (0.61) (-0.05) (0.52) 
Earnings -0.027 0.074 0.121 0.025 -0.005 0.041 0.084 -0.029 
 (-0.40) (1.06) (1.16) (0.49) (-0.51) (1.07) (1.48) (-0.82) 
Cash Flow 0.306*** 0.036 0.096 0.155** 0.007 0.004 -0.058 0.022 
 (3.80) (0.55) (1.50) (2.22) (0.31) (0.11) (-1.22) (0.37) 
Leverage 0.013 0.016 -0.030 -0.050** 0.000 -0.009 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.39) (0.55) (-0.99) (-2.05) (0.07) (-0.92) (0.15) (-0.18) 
MTB 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.000* 
 (1.27) (-0.75) (-1.46) (-0.45) (1.22) (-0.84) (1.81) (1.97) 
Sales Growth -0.001 -0.011 -0.010 -0.037* 0.032*** 0.006 -0.014 0.040*** 
 (-0.02) (-0.61) (-0.48) (-1.83) (5.51) (0.77) (-1.05) (2.87) 
CapEx 2014 -0.249 -0.175 -0.173 -0.039 0.906*** 0.649*** 0.940*** 0.968*** 
 (-0.59) (-1.20) (-1.11) (-0.35) (10.36) (6.94) (10.84) (12.87) 
RD 0.048 -0.013 0.029 0.048 0.006 0.063 -0.010 -0.021 
 (0.35) (-0.10) (0.28) (0.77) (0.26) (1.13) (-0.26) (-1.04) 
ACQ 0.056 -0.021 -0.044* -0.025 0.003 0.003 0.017 -0.001 
 (1.15) (-1.23) (-1.65) (-1.34) (0.34) (0.51) (1.61) (-0.09) 
Firm Age 0.005 -0.010 -0.013 0.008     
 (0.48) (-1.12) (-0.96) (0.94)     
RE/BV 0.000 0.008*** -0.001 -0.000     
 (0.33) (2.74) (-0.91) (-0.06)     
Returns -0.041*** -0.012* -0.017 -0.017**     
 (-2.74) (-1.94) (-0.94) (-2.16)     
Options -0.036 -0.043 -0.045 0.021     
 (-0.99) (-0.82) (-1.65) (0.57)     
St. Dev. Earnings 0.177 0.075 -0.042 -0.135     
 (1.55) (0.94) (-0.37) (-1.53)     
Dividends Lag -0.239 0.092 -0.468** -0.250 0.032 -0.231* -0.071 -0.101 
 (-1.41) (0.56) (-2.13) (-0.93) (0.78) (-1.80) (-0.62) (-1.29) 
Repurchase Lag 0.480*** 0.486*** 0.425*** 0.784*** 0.011 -0.008 0.021 -0.056* 
 (4.07) (4.88) (5.69) (6.10) (0.70) (-0.21) (0.78) (-1.68) 
Intercept -0.074 -0.008 0.045 -0.050 0.002 0.018 -0.002 -0.012 
 (-0.98) (-0.18) (0.74) (-1.06) (0.27) (1.28) (-0.08) (-0.60) 
N 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
adj. R2     0.7814 0.6647 0.6740 0.7860 
Log Likelihood 1279.067 1312.525 1306.875 1268.342 717.402 656.377 565.695 582.033 
 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions on a sample of multinational firms explaining firm-level annual 
expenditure for the period 2015 – 2018, excluding 2017. The dependent variable in Columns 1 – 4 and 5 – 8 is 
Repurchases and CapEx. Columns 1 – 4 and 5 – 8 are disaggregated by the quartile cutoffs of abnormal investment 
from Biddle et al. (2009). The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as the scalar in the following variable 
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definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. Dividends is total dividends paid scaled by total 
assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases are total repurchases scaled by total 
assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases of common and preferred stock less any decrease 
in the redemption value of preferred stock in the prior year, or minus the decrease in preferred stock in the prior 
year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Post is equal to one for 
fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. Foreign Cash is foreign cash at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by 
total assets. Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign cash at the end of 2014, scaled by total assets. Book ETR is 
current federal tax expense scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. 
Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 
2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income before extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal to operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Leverage is long term debt at 
the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding divided by the total 
book value. Sales Growth is total sales minus lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 
2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. RD is equal to research and development expense scaled by total 
assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on mergers and 
acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to book 
value of common equity. Returns is monthly compounded stock return for the two years prior to period t. Options is 
the annual percentage change in total diluted shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made during year 
t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. Continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects are included. ***, **, * 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 two-tailed significance levels. 
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Table 7 
Domestic and foreign capital expenditure 
 (1) (2) 
 Domestic CapEx  
Marginal 
Weak Health 
Foreign CapEx  
Marginal 
Weak Health 
Post -0.020*** -0.001 
 (-3.35) (-0.12) 
Foreign Cash 0.045 0.042 
 (0.86) (0.78) 
Foreign Cash × Post 0.111** 0.026 
 (2.02) (0.45) 
Book ETR 0.002 -0.050* 
 (0.11) (-1.83) 
Cash ETR -0.049* 0.037 
 (-1.92) (1.31) 
Loss 0.035** -0.037** 
 (2.30) (-2.19) 
Size 0.004* 0.004 
 (1.77) (1.32) 
Foreign Earnings -0.055 -0.195 
 (-0.50) (-1.27) 
Domestic Earnings 0.285** -0.226 
 (2.54) (-1.42) 
Cash Flow -0.104 0.168** 
 (-1.37) (2.12) 
Leverage 0.005 -0.030 
 (0.22) (-1.36) 
MTB -0.000* 0.000* 
 (-1.87) (1.84) 
Sales Growth 0.076*** -0.006 
 (2.84) (-0.29) 
CapEx 2014 0.671*** 0.636*** 
 (3.22) (2.67) 
RD -0.221* 0.061 
 (-1.77) (0.48) 
ACQ 0.147*** 0.068** 
 (3.68) (2.01) 
Depr 0.319 -0.521* 
 (1.07) (-1.72) 
Intercept -0.045* -0.026 
 (-1.71) (-0.79) 
N 164 164 
adj. R2 0.5697 0.1485 
 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions on a sample of multinational firms explaining firm-level 
domestic and foreign capital expenditures for the period 2016 and 2018. The sample is constrained to marginally 
weak financial health firms which are firms where the Z-Score is between 2.131 and 3.466. The dependent variable 
in column 1 and 2 is domestic and foreign capital expenditures, respectively. The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is 
used as the scalar in the following variable definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. 
Dividends is total dividends paid scaled by total assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. 
Repurchases are total repurchases scaled by total assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases 
of common and preferred stock less any decrease in the redemption value of preferred stock in the prior year, or 
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minus the decrease in preferred stock in the prior year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. Foreign 
Cash is foreign cash at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total assets. Domestic Cash is total cash minus foreign 
cash at the end of 2014, scaled by total assets. Book ETR is current federal tax expense scaled by pretax income 
minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled by pretax 
income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income before 
extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal to 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Leverage is long term debt at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total 
assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding divided by the total book value. Sales Growth is total sales minus 
lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
RD is equal to research and development expense scaled by total assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in 
Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on mergers and acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to 
zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in 
Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to book value of common equity. Returns is monthly 
compounded stock return for the two years prior to period t. Options is the annual percentage change in total diluted 
shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made during year t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation 
of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects are included. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 two-
tailed significance levels. 
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Table 8 
Difference-in-differences analysis 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total 
Payout 
Repurchases CapEx Domestic 
CapEx 
     
Post 0.012 0.006 -0.007 -0.005** 
 (0.79) (0.40) (-0.68) (-2.37) 
MNC -0.002 0.001 -0.006*** 0.005* 
 (-0.85) (0.51) (-3.22) (1.92) 
MNC × Post 0.008** 0.006* -0.004 0.006** 
 (2.07) (1.74) (-0.87) (2.05) 
Book ETR 0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.59) (0.32) (-1.15) (-0.24) 
Cash ETR 0.006 0.005 -0.003 -0.006 
 (1.28) (1.05) (-0.77) (-1.36) 
Loss -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** 
 (-0.95) (-1.63) (-1.56) (-3.92) 
Size 0.002** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 
 (2.42) (4.75) (1.47) (1.31) 
Earnings -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.006* 
 (-0.25) (-0.82) (-0.50) (1.67) 
Cash Flow 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.026** -0.009* 
 (7.03) (5.82) (2.23) (-1.91) 
Leverage -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.001 
 (-4.40) (-3.47) (-2.89) (-0.24) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.006 
 (3.80) (2.91) (1.11) (-1.36) 
Sales Growth -0.002 -0.003 0.046*** -0.008*** 
 (-0.30) (-0.52) (5.62) (-3.92) 
CapEx 2014 -0.078*** -0.070*** 0.963*** 0.001 
 (-3.30) (-3.11) (21.67) (1.31) 
RD -0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.006* 
 (-0.45) (0.12) (-0.84) (1.67) 
ACQ -0.032** -0.042*** -0.003 0.071*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.93) (-0.29) (4.45) 
Firm Age 0.002 -0.002   
 (0.89) (-1.07)   
RE/BV 0.002*** 0.001**   
 (3.06) (2.42)   
Returns -0.007** -0.008***   
 (-2.53) (-2.98)   
Options -0.034* -0.052***   
 (-1.94) (-3.16)   
St. Dev. Earnings -0.009 -0.011   
 (-0.38) (-0.49)   
Dividends Lag 1.187*** -0.018 -0.108** -0.007 
 (16.40) (-0.27) (-2.18) (-0.14) 
Repurchase Lag 0.698*** 0.724*** 0.017 -0.008* 
 (18.74) (22.04) (0.89) (-1.86) 
Intercept -0.045* -0.034 -0.011 0.015*** 
 (-1.76) (-1.47) (-0.83) (3.42) 
N 4,032 4,032 4,032 2,804 
adj. R2   0.5302 0.0466 
Log Likelihood 4470.413 3955.637 5909.569  
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Panel B: Financial Health Cross-Section 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Repurchases  
Weak Health 
Repurchases  
Strong Health 
Domestic CapEx 
Weak Health 
Domestic CapEx 
Strong Health 
     
Post 0.021 -0.016 -0.004 -0.005** 
 (1.28) (-0.66) (-1.43) (-2.04) 
MNC -0.003 0.006* -0.007* 0.016*** 
 (-1.18) (1.71) (-1.90) (5.51) 
MNC × Post 0.008** 0.003 0.012*** 0.002 
 (2.11) (0.49) (2.66) (0.70) 
Book ETR -0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.006 
 (-0.64) (0.83) (0.15) (-1.15) 
Cash ETR 0.003 0.009 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.60) (1.07) (-0.59) (-0.96) 
Loss -0.003 -0.004 -0.008** -0.008** 
 (-1.27) (-0.77) (-2.52) (-2.41) 
Size 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001** -0.001 
 (4.12) (2.88) (2.12) (-1.28) 
Earnings -0.006 0.001 0.004 0.008 
 (-1.11) (0.09) (1.01) (0.84) 
Cash Flow 0.057*** 0.091*** -0.007 -0.015* 
 (3.05) (4.46) (-1.22) (-1.78) 
Leverage -0.017*** -0.023** 0.006 0.007 
 (-2.63) (-2.42) (1.60) (1.60) 
MTB 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (1.23) (2.72) (0.05) (0.93) 
Sales Growth 0.000 -0.007 0.003 0.007** 
 (0.01) (-0.72) (1.02) (2.48) 
CapEx 2014 -0.050* -0.094*** 0.011 0.044 
 (-1.88) (-2.59) (0.32) (1.14) 
RD 0.009 0.006 0.018** -0.008 
 (0.42) (0.28) (2.08) (-0.71) 
ACQ -0.028 -0.060*** 0.084*** 0.065*** 
 (-1.50) (-2.86) (2.78) (3.50) 
Firm Age -0.002 -0.003   
 (-0.77) (-0.87)   
RE/BV 0.001 0.002*   
 (1.39) (1.92)   
Returns -0.004 -0.012**   
 (-1.49) (-2.52)   
Options -0.040** -0.081***   
 (-2.04) (-2.90)   
St. Dev. Earnings -0.017 -0.003   
 (-0.70) (-0.09)   
Dividends Lag 0.023 -0.055 0.049 -0.014 
 (0.21) (-0.61) (0.43) (-0.25) 
Repurchase Lag 0.724*** 0.699*** -0.002 -0.012** 
 (12.43) (16.50) (-0.16) (-2.42) 
Intercept 0.001 -0.040 0.011 0.024*** 
 (0.09) (-1.54) (1.41) (4.36) 
N 2,016 2,016 1,401 1,403 
adj. R2   0.0327 0.0794 
Log Likelihood 2033.570 2011.036   
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This table presents estimates from difference-in-differences regressions a combined sample of domestic and 
multinational firms explaining firm-level repurchases and capital expenditures. Panel A uses the full sample and 
Panel B disaggregates the sample on the Z-Score median. The 2014 fiscal year-end total assets is used as the scalar 
in the following variable definitions. Total Payout is the sum of Dividends and Repurchases. Dividends is total 
dividends paid scaled by total assets, set equal to zero when dividends are missing in Compustat. Repurchases are 
total repurchases scaled by total assets. A repurchase is identified as a positive value for purchases of common and 
preferred stock less any decrease in the redemption value of preferred stock in the prior year, or minus the decrease 
in preferred stock in the prior year, if the redemption value is missing. CapEx is capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets. Post is equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2018, zero otherwise. MNC is equal to 1 if the firm reports 
nonmissing pretax foreign income from the period 2011 – 2013. Book ETR is current federal tax expense scaled by 
pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Cash ETR is current taxes paid scaled 
by pretax income minus special items, measured at the end of fiscal year 2014. Loss is equal to 1 when income 
before extraordinary items is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at 
the end of fiscal year 2014. Earnings is income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is equal 
to operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Leverage is long term debt at the end of fiscal year 2014 scaled by total 
assets. MTB is market value of shares outstanding divided by the total book value. Sales Growth is total sales minus 
lagged sales, scaled by lagged sales. CapEx 2014 is total fiscal year 2014 capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
RD is equal to research and development expense scaled by total assets. RD is equal to zero when missing in 
Compustat. ACQ is equal to total expenditures on mergers and acquisitions scaled by total assets. ACQ is equal to 
zero when missing in Compustat. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in 
Compustat. RE/BV is the ratio of retained earnings to book value of common equity. Returns is monthly 
compounded stock return for the two years prior to period t. Options is the annual percentage change in total diluted 
shares outstanding of firm as if no repurchases were made during year t. St. Dev. Earnings is the standard deviation 
of earnings for the current and previous 4 years. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects are included. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 two-
tailed significance levels. 
 
